How Europe’s migration policy and arms empowered Sudan’s warlords

Following the coup that overthrew al-Bashir in 2019, a fragile civilian-military transitional arrangement failed to unite competing factions. Political instability, localised rebellions, and a simmering rivalry between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the successor to the Popular Defence Forces, government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed who committed war crimes in Darfur in the early 2000s – escalated into full-blown conflict.
By mid-2023, Sudan was effectively split into contested zones, with major urban centres, such as Khartoum and Omdurman, transformed into battlefields, and millions of civilians displaced internally or forced across borders as refugees.

Although geographically removed, the European Union played a consequential role in these developments. For nearly a decade, it pursued a strategy of “externalising” migration control, directing aid, training, and equipment to African states ostensibly to reduce irregular migration towards Europe.

In Sudan, this approach produced unintended and devastating consequences that the EU is yet to be held accountable for. Funding initially justified under “migration management” and “capacity building” intersected with opaque arms flows, Gulf intermediaries, and weak oversight. European money and materiel, intended to stabilise populations and impose border forces to buffer the migratory ambitions of Africans, may have indirectly reinforced the very actors now perpetrating war crimes in Sudan.
Between 2014 and 2018, the EU channelled more than 200 million euros ($232m at the current exchange rate) into Sudan via the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Better Migration Management (BMM) initiative.

These programmes formally aimed to strengthen migration control, border security and anti-trafficking enforcement. In reality, they entrenched cooperation between the EU and Sudan’s security structures, including units that effectively merged into the RSF.

As early as 2017, the Enough Project, an advocacy group focused on conflict, corruption and human rights, published a report titled Border Control from Hell, warning that “the gravest concern about the EU’s new partnership with Sudan is that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the most abusive paramilitary groups in the country, stands to benefit from EU funding” and that “the equipment that enables identification and registration of migrants will also reinforce the surveillance capabilities of a Sudanese government that has violently suppressed Sudanese citizens for the past 28 years”.

Two years later, the EU had to suspend several migration-control activities in Sudan because there was a risk that resources could be “diverted for repressive aims”, according to an EU official document cited by German news outlet Deutsche Welle.

And yet, a factsheet titled What the EU really does in Sudan, published on the bloc’s website in 2018, claimed: “The EU does not provide any financial support to the Government of Sudan … The Rapid Support Forces of the Sudanese military do not benefit directly or indirectly from EU funding.”

All this raises an important question: If the EU knew of the risk of diversion, why did it still invest hundreds of millions into a context where control over the end use of training, equipment and funds was manifestly weak?

What is worse is that the EU’s role was not limited to supplying funds that could be misappropriated. It also provided weapons, albeit indirectly.

As the conflict deepened, investigators started uncovering foreign-manufactured weapons and ammunition circulating widely among the RSF and the SAF. Verified imagery, open-source analysis and serial number tracing have revealed European-manufactured systems on Sudan’s battlefields. In November 2024, Amnesty International released an investigation disclosing that Nimr Ajban armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were equipped with French-made Galix defensive systems. Amnesty’s analysts verified images and videos from multiple Sudanese locations and concluded that, if deployed in Darfur, their use would breach the longstanding United Nations arms embargo on the region.