As weapons taboos shatter, Kyiv and the West become strong allies
Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine a year ago insisting that he was reclaiming a historic part of Russia. The war that ensued was, in his terms, a civil war among Russians.
It was also largely a civil war among Soviet-era systems.
In a war in which both sides relied on Russian ammunition and systems, Russia had the clear resupply advantage.
The West’s determination to prop up Ukraine’s arsenal meant that it had to transition Ukraine to Western systems.
European Council President Charles Michel recently described what an unprecedented decision this was for Europe.
“When [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy called me on February 24th, he said, ‘Charles, we need weapons. We need ammunition.’ Three days later, we formally decided to provide – for the first time in EU history – lethal equipment to a third country,” Michel told the Ukrainian parliament on January 19.
But that created a dilemma.
How far and how fast should the West go in opposing Russia in a proxy war – especially one few people at the outset felt Ukraine could win?
According to Russian principles on nuclear deterrence, Moscow may retaliate if it is targeted with a nuclear attack or may use nuclear arms if a conventional assault “threatens the very existence of the state”.
“[Russian] doctrine is that it will use nuclear weapons to de-escalate when the war is escalating and not going well,” said Colonel Dale Buckner, a former United States special forces commander with extensive intelligence experience who now runs Global Guardian, a multinational security consultancy.
“In order to de-escalate, [the Russians] will escalate using chemical or nuclear weapons,” Buckner told Al Jazeera. “It’s a written document. That is the Russian protocol, which then puts fear in everybody.”
Russia’s nuclear threat abated towards last autumn as India and China, its nuclear-armed allies, discouraged any nuclear reprisals.
But in the meantime, Russia played on Western fears.
